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This paper examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and well-
being in poor countries, as measured by life expectancy and child mortality. The effect of 
foreign direct investment on impoverished nations has long been the subject of debate in 
both economics and sociology. While much of the previous literature has investigated 
foreign direct investment’s effect on measures of well-being, this paper constitutes a new 
contribution by examining the structure of this investment in the form of foreign direct 
investment concentration. Foreign direct investment concentration is the proportion of 
investment from the top investing nation, and greater levels are hypothesized to have a 
detrimental impact on life expectancy and under-five mortality. 
Drawing from a variety of theoretical perspectives, including 
modernization/liberalism and dependency theory, this paper uses a panel data set and a 
longitudinal methodology. The hypothesis is partially supported: while neither FDI nor 
FDI concentration are significant indicators of life expectancy or under-five mortality, 
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The scope of the problem 
In this paper I examine the relationship between economic globalization and 
human well-being. More specifically, I wish to unpack the effects of both the structure 
and magnitude of foreign direct investment (FDI) on child mortality and life expectancy 
in the less developed world. This is a novel approach to this type of research, as the 
structure of FDI is often overlooked as an important explanatory factor.  
The study of infant mortality and life expectancy in less developed countries 
(LDCs) fits into the broader scope of research into the quality of life for people dwelling 
in impoverished nations. Poverty in the less developed world is a pressing issue, with 1.4 
billion people living on less than $1.25 per day (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development 2011). Though such projects as the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) shed light on poverty in poor countries and motivate action 
to reduce it, the problem persists. The UN stresses eight major areas for improvement in 
its MDG project: end poverty and hunger, universal education, gender equality, child 
health, maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, and global 
partnerships.  
While all the goals are important, I have chosen to focus on infant mortality and 





children is arguably the most fundamental piece of well-being. The infant mortality rate 
and life expectancy of a country displays clearly, and in a simple snapshot, the extent of 
human suffering. Second, these measures are important indicators of other aspects of 
well-being: a nation with low infant mortality and high life expectancy will likely thrive 
in other areas as well. Third, observing and understanding differences in infant mortality 
and life expectancy between countries throws light on the most basic inequalities in the 
world. 
The UN reports that, despite continued efforts, “child deaths are falling, but not 
quickly enough” (United Nations 2010:1). Developed nations have an average under-five 
mortality rate of eight deaths per 1,000 live births. In less developed countries, the figure 
is nine times higher, at 72 deaths per 1,000 live births. The deaths of young children in 
poor countries are largely due to “malnutrition and lack of access to adequate primary 
health care and infrastructure, such as water and sanitation” (United Nations 2010:1). 
Similarly, life expectancy at birth in the most developed countries is about 77 years; in 
LDCs, it is only about 57 (United Nations 2011). On average, people in LDCs can 
anticipate a lifespan fully twenty years shorter than their counterparts in developed 
countries.  
Life expectancy at birth is one of three indicators that make up the UN Human 
Development Index (HDI), along with measures of education and income. The impetus 
for developing the HDI was to provide a metric for development not solely based upon 
country-level economic indicators like GDP. Life expectancy is included in the index as a 
proxy for the ability of a person in a given country to live “a long and healthy life” 





Reducing infant mortality and increasing life expectancy are worthy ends in and 
of themselves, as these are painful and traumatic experiences for families as well as the 
larger community. However, there is also evidence that improvements in these areas can 
make national economies stronger, as the workforce is happier, healthier and more 
reliable. It is my goal in this paper to come to a better understanding of one of the causes 
of differences in infant mortality and life expectancy between nations, and thereby 
contribute to the improvement in quality of life for people in LDCs.  
Hypotheses 
This paper contributes new ideas to the relationship between FDI and infant 
mortality/life expectancy in two areas. First, I will examine both the structure and the 
magnitude of FDI. While previous studies have focused mainly on magnitude, there has 
been no published research to date exploring the effects of the structure of FDI on 
measures of well-being. While magnitude refers to the amount of foreign dollars invested 
into a less developed economy, structure refers to the type of investment. I will consider 
FDI concentration, the proportion of FDI contributed by the single largest investing 
nation. Second, the data and methodology I use are the most current available. I have 
access to the most recent data available for these measures. I utilize longitudinal panel 
analysis, the standard statistical method for these types of data. 
I hypothesize the structure of FDI and its magnitude have different effects on 
infant mortality and life expectancy. Previous researchers have disagreed on whether the 
magnitude of FDI is on balance positive or negative for well-being in LDCs. The reason 
for the divergent findings may be due to differences in the structure of that investment 





investment and where the investment originates may be important. I hypothesize that, 
when controlling for structure of investment, the effect of magnitude of investment will 
wash out. Greater FDI concentration will have a negative impact on human well-being, 
reflecting a situation in which a single investing country has greater control over a less 
developed economy. Thus, decision-making in the interest of the needs of the LDC may 
be hindered.  
Hypothesis 1: Greater FDI penetration reduces life expectancy 
Hypothesis 2: Greater FDI concentration reduces life expectancy  
Hypothesis 3: Greater FDI penetration increases under-five mortality  




In the literature, four distinct modes of thinking emerge to explain the variation in 
infant mortality and life expectancy across LDCs: modernization/neoliberalism, 
dependency/world system, gender stratification, and developmental state theories. While 
modernization/neoliberalism and dependency theories tend to dominate, the gender 
stratification and developmental state theories are important variants. Neither are as well 
fleshed out or thoroughly explored as modernization and dependency, but both have 
added important theoretical concepts to the field. 
Sociologists and thinkers in sister disciplines tend to agree that economic 
development—the creation of a robust, diversified and growing economy—is a precursor 
to social development, which yields an improvement in quality of life. Where they differ 
is how to bring about such economic development. Modernization theorists and 
neoliberals point to internal barriers; dependency theorists point to external barriers. 
Modernization/Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is the doctrine that has prevailed as the dominant economic policy 
framework in contemporary globalization and international trade. Its influence is so 
profound that it is regarded by many as simply the “common sense” approach (Kukoč 
2009:65). Its philosophical predecessor is classical liberalism, and many of the ideas 





nineteenth centuries (Kiely 2007). These thinkers stressed the importance of free markets 
unencumbered by government regulations or trade barriers in initiating and sustaining 
economic growth (Smith 1982). In addition, Ricardo argued regions should specialize in 
producing certain goods and services that lend them a comparative advantage (Ricardo 
1948). Combined with minimal regulations and tariffs, specialization means consumers 
may have access to the highest quality goods at the lowest cost; meanwhile, producers 
may reap the financial benefits. In this way, the market will tend to regulate itself, as 
producers of lower quality or higher cost goods will be eliminated by their competition 
(Smith 1982).  
The approach of these early liberal economists was highly nuanced. While Smith 
“has sometimes been caricatured as someone who saw no role for government in 
economic life” (The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 2008), in fact he advocated for 
a strong state to intervene in the interest of the public good. These interventions include 
enforcing patent laws, protecting private property, and building and maintaining physical 
infrastructure. 
In the postWorld War II, postcolonial era, economists and other social scientists 
adapted this approach to improving the lot of those living in the so-called Third World 
and called it “Modernization Theory” (Shandra et al. 2004, 2005). For sociologists like 
W.W. Rostow (1960) and Alex Inkeles (1969), “development was a question of instilling 
the ‘right’ orientations—values and norms—in the cultures of the non-Western world” 
(Portes 1997:230). Modernization theorists emphasized the importance of imitation in 
development (Shandra et al. 2004, 2005; Shen and Williamson 2000). They argued that 





to those undertaken by European countries in the previous century (Boehmer and 
Williamson 1996; Shen and Williamson 1997). 
These changes included internal factors as well as external linkages to more 
developed economies (Shen and Williamson 2000). Most basic to the modernization 
approach is the idea of a free market, as it is believed to be the most efficient means by 
which to distribute scarce goods (Rostow 1960). Global economic openness is thought to 
bring the greatest benefits to the most people (Mihalache-O’Keef and Li 2011), so LDCs 
were encouraged to attract foreign capital and trade. This interaction would in short order 
lead to knowledge and technology transfers to LDCs (Rostow 1960). In addition, LDCs 
must focus on improving educational opportunities, invest in industrialization, and 
encourage the growth of cities (Shen and Williamson 2000). 
Once a nation has undergone this transformation from a traditional to a modern 
society, other benefits will naturally accrue (Shandra et al. 2004, 2005). Modernization 
theorists argue that industrialization and economic development promote human well-
being by fostering “improvements in education, housing, nutrition, health care, sanitation 
and various public services” (Frey and Field 2000:217). Technology spillovers as a result 
of trade with more developed economies will improve health and medical care in LDCs 
(Owen and Wu 2007). Most important for this paper, modernization is thought to reduce 
infant and child mortality (Frey and Field 2000; Owen and Wu 2007). In short, 
developing economies greatly benefit from their links with those that are more advanced 
(Mihalache-O’Keef and Li 2011). 
Modernization theorists recognize that not everyone benefits from 





occur in the early stages of modernization (Kuznets 1963; Stokes and Anderson 1990), 
though countries will eventually achieve a more equitable distribution of income over the 
long term. Kuznets (1963) hypothesized that the relationship between gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and income inequality was U-shaped: at lower and higher 
levels of development, income distribution is fairly equitable; at only modest levels of 
development, inequality is quite high. However, “even if dependency leads to inequality 
and relative deprivation, most of the population reaps absolute gains through rising 
standards of living, increased wages, and ultimately better well-being” (Brady, Kaya, and 
Beckfield 2007:3). While it is not perfect, “aggregate economic growth benefits most of 
the people most of the time; and it is usually associated with progress in other, social 
dimensions of development” (Stiglitz and Squire 1998:139). 
Following the global economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, economists began 
to rethink some of their long-held principles. During these decades, “import substitution, 
five-year plans, government ownership and control of strategic industries, regulation of 
the labor market and state controls over the flow of savings and investment seemed less 
effective” (Fine, Lapavitsas, and Pincus 2001:x). The “new political-economic 
liberalism—neoliberalism—mandated the removal of governments’ hold over the 
economy and the reintroduction of open competition into economic life” (Cohen and 
Centeno 2006:33). In developed countries, certain elements of postwar Keynesianism, 
such as social security and worker protections, began to be rolled back in favor of market 
solutions (Massey et al. 2006). Meanwhile, in the LDCs, supranational organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began to encourage 






While neoliberals maintained that the benefits able to be accrued through 
economic growth were the same, the means by which to attain that growth shifted. 
Economist John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” in 1989 (Sheppard 
and Leitner 2010) to describe the neoliberal approach, “10 policy instruments about 
whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable degree of consensus” 
(Williamson 1990:7). These prescriptions include 1) fiscal discipline, and the avoidance 
of large debts relative to GDP; 2) redirection of subsidies toward education, health care 
and development of infrastructure rather than consumer goods, as well as overall reduced 
government expenditure; 3) tax reform to reduce the marginal tax rate; 4) interest rates 
being determined by the market; 5) exchange rates being determined by the market; 6) 
export-oriented trade policy; 7) liberalization of foreign financial flows such as  FDI; 8) 
privatization of state enterprises; 9) deregulation; and 10) legal security of private 
property rights. For LDCs, this meant a shift from governments to markets (Williamson 
1990) and greater integration with the global economy through trade, investment, and 
financial liberalization (Dollar and Kraay 2002). In addition, the neoliberal approach 
stressed an export-led growth strategy rather than the import-substitution one that 
dominated the earlier era (Stiglitz 2002). 
In more recent years, a postWashington Consensus has begun to emerge. The new 
neoliberalism retains a belief in the global capitalist free market, but makes space for 
some Keynesian prescriptions (Sheppard and Leitner 2010). Shaped in large part by the 
ideas of the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, these new development economists point out 





parties (Fine 2001). It remains to be seen whether the new development economics 
represents a significant departure from neoliberalism, or is merely a tweak (Fine 2001; 
Sheppard and Leitner 2010). Those at the other end of the neoliberal spectrum still 
contest this view. In recent years they have advocated for an even more extreme market 
approach, including the privatization of education and other sectors previously seen as 
the purview of the state (Collins and Wiseman 2012; Klees, Samoff, and Stromquist 
2011). 
Sociologists and economists alike have found empirical support for the neoliberal 
and modernization perspectives in explaining differing rates of infant and child mortality. 
Shin (1975) observed that, while social development indicators may account for more of 
the differences in infant mortality cross-sectionally, longitudinal analysis reveals 
economic development is more important. Yang and Pendleton (1980) concluded 
economic development indirectly decreases infant mortality by improving living 
standards. In a seminal work, Firebaugh and Beck (1994) found beneficial effects of 
economic development are “large and robust” (631). Pritchett and Summers (1996) 
concluded “over half a million child deaths in 1990 alone can be attributed to poor 
economic performance in the 1980s” (841). More recently, Shandra et al. (2005) found 
mixed results, but concluded high levels of development as well as education helped 
decrease infant mortality in LDCs. Finally, Owen and Wu (2007) found increased trade 
openness is associated with lower infant mortality rates.   
There has been similar support for the positive effects of FDI on life expectancy. 
Firebaugh and Beck (1994) found that life expectancy tends to increase with greater FDI. 





country, trade openness is associated with increased life expectancy. Bergh and Nillson 
(2010) tested the effects of three dimensions of globalization on life expectancy: 
economic, social, and political. They concluded that, while social and political 
globalization are insignificant, economic globalization is “good for living” (1200) in that 
it increases life expectancy.  
In sum, theorists who subscribe to modernization and neoliberalism argue 
participation in the global economy is the most efficient way to bring about economic 
development and its concomitant social benefits. Trade liberalization, privatization and a 
freely operating market are significant elements in this global economic participation. 
Dependency 
Largely as a reaction against the modernization and neoliberal schools of thought, 
Marxist-derived theories argue that, for poor countries, development is nearly impossible 
under the current political-economic regime (see Arrighi 1994; Chase-Dunn 1989; Frank 
2000; Wallerstein 1979). Recognizing the emergence in the new economic world order of 
monopoly capitalism and corporate enterprise, they declared that a new type of 
imperialism had developed, one that was more subtle, but nevertheless powerful. 
Dependency theorists argued that “the global capitalist system, largely but not 
exclusively through transnational corporations (TNCs), operated actively to underdevelop 
the Third World and that no genuine development was possible as long as this system 
survived” (Sklair 1995:36). Many incarnations of this theory emerged over the ensuing 
years, and “there are still points of serious disagreement among the various strains of 
dependency theorists; it is a mistake to think that there is only one unified theory of 





analyses of most dependency theorists” (Ferraro 2008:59). 
The proponents of the original theory of dependent underdevelopment took issue 
with the modernization idea that the barriers to development are internal. Instead, these 
scholars looked to external forces. Dos Santos (2003) defined dependency as “a situation 
in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and 
expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected” (278). In these cases, the 
dependent economy can expand only in the image of the dominant one, which can in the 
short term have either a positive or negative effect (Frank 2000). In addition, they argued 
that the model of modernization was oversimplified and ignored larger political issues 
and structural relations between countries (Shen and Williamson 1997). 
The mechanisms by which dependency can hinder development—both economic 
and social—are not entirely clear. The effects change with regard to which dimension of 
dependency one examines. In general, dependency scholars assert that it makes LDCs 
beholden to the interests of developed countries, which may or may not be their own. 
This means that policy-makers may forgo enacting laws to protect citizens and the 
environment because they hamper the free movement of capital (e.g., Jorgenson 2009; 
Shandra et al. 2005; Wimberley 1990). In addition, dependency exacerbates income 
inequality by creating a well-connected elite, while the benefits tend not to trickle down 
to the masses. Income inequality is anathema to economic development, as the majority 
of people are barred from participating in the opportunities made available by 
development (Shen and Williamson 1997; Stokes and Anderson 1990; Wimberley 1990). 
Scholars have also found that, even at comparable levels of economic development, 





suggests that inequality itself may be bad for one’s health (Brady 2009; Kawachi and 
Kennedy 2002; Wilkinson 1996).  
The first studies demonstrating a link between inequality and health were 
performed within-country. Wilkinson (1996) refers to such important historical case 
studies as that in Roseto, Pennsylvania and the experience of Britain during and 
immediately following World War II. In both examples, researchers were able to observe 
these regions over time. Roseto was known to have very low incidence of heart disease, 
though the behavior patterns of its residents did not differ substantially from those in 
surrounding towns. What was different, however, was the astounding degree of social 
cohesion and outward egalitarianism. Though there was income inequality, Roseto 
residents chose not to engage in the conspicuous consumption that characterized other 
areas. Another important small-sample, longitudinal study was the Whitehall Study 
(Marmot and Smith 1997). This research examined a group of middle class, white, male 
civil servants. Because of the nature of study design, controls for certain demographic 
variables, as well as access to health care, were built in. The main finding was that there 
was a clear gradient effect as those with more powerful positions in the bureaucracy had 
better health outcomes and those lower in the hierarchy had worse ones. 
Perhaps more critically, dependent economies can fall victim to unequal 
exchange. When a given commodity is sold at a consistent price everywhere in the world, 
consumers who live in countries where they receive higher wages are paying a smaller 
proportion of their income toward purchasing that commodity. Transnational 
corporations use this wage differential to their advantage and produce goods in poor 





(Emmanuel 1972). This can be problematic for a dependent economy because its market 
position is weakened when it is consistently producing a good at a much lower price than 
it is later sold (Frank 2000). This situation results in so-called superprofits for TNCs, a 
consequence of exploitation of workers in LDCs (Lenin 1968).  
Because researchers recognize that many dimensions of dependency exist, those 
interested in studying this concept utilize a range of measures of dependency. Debt 
dependence describes a situation in which an LDC is rendered dependent upon one or 
more developed nations because of crippling national debt incurred through either 
unilateral or IMF/World Bank lending strategies. These strategies often require poor 
countries to engage in structural adjustment and austerity measures in order to repay the 
loan, thus limiting the ability of nations to provide for their citizens in even the most 
basic ways (e.g., Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Chase-Dunn 1975; Shandra, Shandra, and 
London 2010). This limits the country’s ability to invest in human health and 
infrastructure as well as domestic entrepreneurial endeavors. 
Others focus on export commodity concentration dependency, when an LDC’s 
economic development is limited by reliance on producing goods for export to developed 
nations, and has little or no domestic market for these products (Kentor and Boswell 
2003; Shen and Williamson 1997). Very often, an LDC will specialize in just one or a 
few products. While this can mean the production of these goods is extremely efficient, it 
may also lead to a crisis if the commodity suddenly loses value in the global marketplace. 
In this way, the LDC is especially vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global economics 
(Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007; Ragin and Delacroix 1979). Export partner 





which can make the LDC beholden to that one nation’s economic interests rather than its 
own (Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson 2007). Aid dependency occurs when the LDC relies 
upon regular injections of foreign aid in order to support its basic needs. Foreign aid, 
despite its good intentions, is not always targeted appropriately (Karlan and Appel 2011). 
Food aid, for example, can make local farmers obsolete by driving down the price of food 
(McMichael 2004). 
However, many believe FDI has the greatest impact (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 
1985; Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 2007; Jorgenson 2009a; Jorgenson 2009b; Shen and 
Williamson 1997; Wimberley 1990). As Shen and Williamson assert, “investment 
dependence is more important than other forms of dependence in the exploitation of the 
LDCs” (670) for a variety of reasons. First, TNCs hamper economic growth in LDCs by 
repatriating profit to their country of origin as well as displacing local businesses. 
Second, they increase within-country income inequality. Third, TNCs may influence 
domestic politics in their own interests, which is often at the expense of democratic 
processes. Such measures may include reducing corporate taxes and relaxing labor and 
environmental laws (Jorgenson 2009b). Fourth, they appropriate land for their own use 
that could otherwise be utilized for small-scale food production and thus displace family 
farmers. Finally, they “corrupt local consumer tastes” (Wimberley 1990:76). 
Scholars typically measure FDI dependence in terms of the magnitude of 
investment, measured in FDI stocks as a proportion of GDP. However, Kentor and 
Boswell (2003) argue FDI concentration may be a more powerful explanatory tool. FDI 
concentration describes the proportion of FDI stocks held by the largest investor. This 





dependence” (304) from the level. Because dependency theorists posit FDI dependence 
inhibits the autonomy of LDCs, it makes theoretical sense that a very large investor might 
wield inordinate power over the economy of an LDC. 
Dependency theory underwent a barrage of criticism on both theoretical and 
methodological grounds. Skocpol (1977) accused Wallerstein of economic reductionism 
and class determinism. Some international development scholars noted that it appeared 
many of the so-called dependent countries were, in fact, developing (Chase-Dunn 1998). 
The spectacular successes of the newly industrializing countries (NICs), located 
predominantly in East Asia, seemed to refute the neoimperialist theories and toll the 
death knell for dependency theory. However, new permutations of the theory emerged. 
Cardoso (2000) and Evans (1989) theorized that the relationship is more nuanced than 
originally observed. For example, Evans proposed that the state can play a pivotal role in 
the development of dependent economies. In this way, some growth for the economies of 
LDCs remains possible, even within the context of dependency. 
Methodologically, Firebaugh’s damning 1992 article showed Bornschier, Chase-
Dunn, and Rubin (1978) had misinterpreted a key statistic. Referring to this mistake as 
the Denominator Effect, Firebaugh concluded dependency theorists were in fact showing 
that FDI was good for the economies of poor nations. Dixon and Boswell (1996a, 1996b) 
responded by using new measures and models to show that their original hypothesis was 
correct. They demonstrated that “foreign capital dependence diminishes economic 
growth, enhances income inequality, and very probably impairs domestic capital 
formation, all irrespective of denominator effects” (Dixon and Boswell 1996a:544; 





While FDI refers to any investment, penetration refers only to the long-term 
accumulation of foreign capital relative to the overall economy. This is the type of 
investment world system and dependency scholars theorize to be the source of many of 
the problems facing less developed economies. This distinction is important because it 
separates “what is bad about foreign investment from what is merely not as good” (546).  
There is much empirical support for the idea that greater, or the wrong type of 
connectivity to the prevailing global economic system can have detrimental effects on 
human well-being. Among the first to study the effects of dependency on human well-
being, Shandra et al. (2004, 2005) and Wimberley (1990) found that transnational 
corporate penetration is strongly associated with higher infant mortality in LDCs. 
Additionally, Shandra et al. (2004) put forth that this relationship was conditional upon 
the level of democracy present in the country: more autocratic nations tended to have 
higher levels of infant mortality. Similarly, Bradshaw et al. (1993) concluded that 
“externally imposed austerity measures” (629), such as those imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund in response to the debt crisis, have had a negative impact on 
child survival. In a study that included political factors as well as economic, Lena and 
London (1993) found those countries with left-leaning economic systems tend to have 
better infant survival rates than right-leaning ones. Shen and Williamson (1997, 2000) 
claimed, while internal factors such as democracy and trade openness are the most 
important in predicting infant mortality rates, it is crucial to consider external factors as 
well. Kick et al. (1990) found militarization and military dependency to be important 
indicators of infant mortality. They argue “arms imports rob public health initiatives and 





Economic dependency acts as a powerful force in indirectly increasing child 
mortality. In an analysis performed by Frey and Field (2000), debt dependency was 
shown to have a powerful positive effect on infant mortality, though other forms of 
dependency did not. Moore, Teixeira, and Shiell (2006) use a network approach 
measuring world system position by volume of trade between partners. They conclude 
that “peripheral countries are structurally disempowered and may be viewed as being at a 
higher level of vulnerability to the negative effects of globalization and trade” (176). This 
finding implies that, no matter their level of economic development in terms of gross 
domestic product per capita, these nations will remain underdeveloped in terms of human 
well-being. Finally, Burns, Kentor, and Jorgenson (2003), Jorgenson (2009a, 2009b), and 
Jorgenson and Burns (2004) showed that environmental degradation is a crucial 
mediating variable in determining infant mortality rates. They observed that greater levels 
of investment and trade in LDCs are associated with higher levels of water pollution, 
which in turn are associated with greater infant mortality rates.  
Scholars have also found empirical support for these dependency-oriented 
theories when examining life expectancy. Ragin and Bradshaw (1992) observed trade 
openness is detrimental to life expectancy. More recently, Bussmann (2008) found that 
economic integration, measured in terms of trade openness, does not directly improve 
women’s life expectancies. However, it may have indirect positive effects: for instance, 
access to education may increase. Tausch (2010) concluded penetration through FDI by 
TNCs has significant negative effects on life expectancy.  
In addition, other studies show a decoupling of economic growth and life 





growth in GDP per capita has strong positive effects on life expectancy, the effect has 
become weaker over time. Similarly, Dollar (2001) argues that globalization can have a 
negative impact on longevity, and advocates the enactment of good health policies to 
complement trade openness. 
Gender stratification 
Gender stratification theorists stress the important role of women in development. 
They argue that infant mortality is closely related to the status of women in society. This 
theory is alternately described as a variant of modernization theory and a critique of it 
(Shen and Williamson 1997; 2000). According to the modernization argument, gender 
equality will occur as a natural outcome of industrialization. As economies industrialize 
and populations become increasingly urban, gender relations will naturally become more 
egalitarian (Scott 1996).  
Boserup (1970) is leery of this claim, asserting that women are often left behind 
in the processes of industrialization. This can occur in several ways. In the context of 
dependency, the economic development that does take place is likely to favor men rather 
than women as the restructuring of economies replaces traditional women’s work, 
removing the means by which many women support themselves. The new jobs created 
are typically taken by men. Simultaneously, “women often lost control over resources 
such as land and are generally excluded from access to new technology” (Momsen 
1991:1). Thus, women are unlikely to be able to take advantage of whatever economic 
opportunities become available (Ward 1984), and women’s status would be expected to 
decrease. In addition, the system “maintains the economic value of children for 





In this way, whatever cultural norms and attitudes that might be expected to flow from 
the West that would reduce the high fertility rate typical of many LDCs will be rendered 
ineffectual. 
Theorists in this vein typically use measures of education, literacy and 
employment to tap into economic and political power (i.e., Frey and Field 2000; Miller 
1992; Scanlan 2004; Shen and Williamson 2000, 1997; Wickrama, Nandy, and 
Wickrama 2003). It is thought that increased levels of education will enable women to 
have more financial autonomy, and this will directly relate to the health of their children. 
In addition, these same researchers measure contraceptive prevalence as an indicator of 
greater personal autonomy, which can have a powerful impact on the well-being of 
women as well as their children: “Women’s use of contraceptives directly reflects their 
ability to make decisions concerning their lives and to acquire and use health services” 
(Wickrama et al. 2003:242).  
This theory as an explanatory model is less than satisfying, because it is unclear 
why some countries are more stratified than others along gender lines. More research 
needs to be done in order to determine what sorts of political and economic arrangements 
increase gender equality. Nevertheless, it is consistently among the most powerful 
indicators of infant mortality, so I will include it in my analysis and discussion.  
Developmental state 
There is great disagreement over the proper role of states in the economic 
development process. In mainstream neoliberal economics and modernization theory, the 
laissez-faire doctrine has dominated over the past few decades. The emergence of the 





developed rapidly after instituting growth strategies promoted by neoliberal economists, 
has been brought forth as evidence of the power of the free market. However, there is 
much evidence to suggest that it was not the free market at all, but state intervention that 
allowed for the rapid growth of countries like the so-called Asian Tigers (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) and others (Gilpin 2001). 
Developmental state theorists argue that states “can operate in ways that increase 
human well-being” (Frey and Field 2000:219) as their national economies grow. For 
example, they can provide health, education and other basic services to the poor. 
According to this perspective, economic dependency is only harmful to human well-
being when the state is unresponsive. Thus, a powerful state can mediate many of the 
negative effects associated with globalization. 
At its heart, the development state is an effective bureaucracy, with clear goals 
and an internal sense of coherence. Unlike Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucracy, however, 
those operating in developmental states are embedded within the wider society rather 
than insulated from it. This creates the possibility for exchange between government and 
society that is missing from other types of states. The policies that such a bureaucracy can 
put into place, then, are responsive to the needs of the people rather than reactive or 
irrelevant (Evans 1985). 
Evans claims that the role these states take on is one of “midwife.” By this, Evans 
means that the state aids in the process of birthing infant industries and nurses them into 
maturity, rather than policing them or establishing competing enterprises. For instance, 
the state can assist emergent entrepreneurs or encourage existing businesses to try their 





such edifices as import tariffs or subsidies. 
Political economists like Gilpin (2001) favor a blend of free markets and strong 
states. This is antithetical to the neoliberal approach, which contends that a large state 
will hamper economic growth. Indeed, Moon (1991) asserts that  
The state is the key institution for basic needs provision for a simple reason. If the 
natural propensity to inequality is to be minimized, the productive capacities of 
the economy must be directed toward the provision of basic human needs. That 
direction must be accomplished outside a system dominated by the logic of capital 
accumulation and microeconomic rationality; that is, it must occur in the political 
realm. (110) 
Developmental state theorists point to the success of the Asian Tiger economies. 
These strong states were able to leverage rapid growth into human well-being gains by 
use of redistributive policies (Evans 1985). 
These theorists typically measure state strength (Frey and Field 2000; Shen and 
Williamson 1997, 2000) as well as state spending on human welfare (Frey and Field 
2000).  
Other explanatory factors 
In addition to these models, cross-national scholars have identified several other 
factors which may have an impact on infant mortality. While it is unclear whether these 
are direct, intervening or conditional factors, they are nevertheless correlated highly with 
infant mortality rates and life expectancy. These include democracy, income inequality, 
presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and urban slum prevalence.  
Level of democracy/autocracy has been shown to influence infant mortality by 
several scholars (Lena and London 1993; Shandra et al. 2004, 2005; Shandra, Shandra, 
and London 2010; Tsai 2006). In each case, greater levels of democracy, typically 





demands for solving development problems” (Shandra et al. 2004:325), decrease the rate 
of infant mortality. This is a robust finding, regardless of which other controls are 
accounted for. 
Some scholars have also found that, even at comparable levels of economic 
development, countries with greater inequality in the distribution of income tend to be 
less healthy. This suggests that inequality itself may be bad for one’s health (Kawachi 
and Kennedy 2002; Wilkinson 1996). In addition, there appear to be diminishing returns 
to increases in GDP. Up to roughly $5000 per capita GDP, there is a strong positive 
correlation between GDP and health. After this level, however, the relationship all but 
disappears and GDP is no longer a strong predictor of a nation’s health (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2005). This initiated a debate on whether absolute or relative deprivation matters 
more. While nearly every scholar would agree that absolute poverty has a negative 
impact on health (i.e., Feinstein 1993, Subramanian et al. 2002), the idea that relative 
poverty matters was at first quite controversial. However, Wilkinson and those who 
followed him were quite successful in showing empirically that it is “the most egalitarian 
rather than the richest developed countries which have the best health” (Wilkinson 
1996:75). 
However, the inequality-health finding is not without its detractors. The sources 
of data typically used by Wilkinson and others have sometimes been called into question. 
Judge (1999) takes issue with the fact that one of the income measures Wilkinson uses is 
based on household-level income, but fails to take into account family size. Using what 
he considers more reliable data, Judge reevaluates Wilkinson’s claim and finds no 





used by many inequality and health researchers to be flawed. He claims that “much cross-
national research uses income inequality data from multiple sources but does not control 
for technical differences in the data that can limit international and intertemporal 
comparability” (234). Further, he asserts many researchers in this field do not use 
adequate control variables. When statistical controls such as year and economic 
development are added to the model, the relationship washes out. Beckfield also suggests 
the use of an FEM model to account for heterogeneity bias, which “can affect this 
research because sampled countries often differ from each other in ways that are left 
unmeasured and thus cannot be included directly in statistical models” (233). Like Judge, 
Beckfield corrects these perceived shortcomings and finds that the relationship between 
inequality and health all but disappears. A potential problem with Beckfield’s study, as 
well as other broad cross-national research designs, is that the relationship between 
inequality and health holds most strongly for developed countries. Proponents of the 
relative income hypothesis argue that for poor countries (i.e., those with GDP per capita 
of $5000 or less), absolute poverty is still the most pressing issue. 
A final criticism of this literature is that it simply represents a statistical artifact 
resulting from using population-level data to model what is essentially an individual-level 
measure. Gravelle (1999) argues that the absolute income hypothesis “is supported by a 
considerable body of evidence…[and] we do not need the relative income hypothesis to 
explain the observed associations between health and income inequality” (99). He 
charges the relative income hypothesis proponents with committing the ecological 
fallacy. 





by rethinking which indicator variables they choose to employ (Kawachi and Kennedy 
1999) as well as utilizing multilevel modeling techniques in order get away from the 
charge of ecological fallacy (Kennedy et al. 1999). These more recent studies have lent 
greater support to the relative income hypothesis. Brady (2009) examined the effects of 
inequality in wealthy Western democracies. He observed that “countries with high 
poverty [despite high GDP] experience more crime and suicide, greater health problems, 
weaker economic productivity, and undermined development and well-being among 
children” (5). 
Even scholars who accept that a relationship exists between income inequality 
and health disagree over the mechanisms by which it occurs. Researchers tend to fall into 
one of two main camps: the psychosocial and the neomaterial. The psychosocial, first 
proposed by Wilkinson (1996), emphasizes how stress derived from coping with an 
inegalitarian society has direct and adverse effects on health. In addition, Wilkinson 
argues there are indirect effects of inequality. In order to cope with such a stressful social 
environment, the poor are more likely to engage in risky lifestyle behaviors.  
In contrast, the neomaterialists emphasize how the poor in inegalitarian societies 
lack physical resources rather than social capital (Lynch 2000). They argue that 
communities that tolerate inequality are also characterized by systematic underinvestment 
in infrastructural projects, which takes a disproportionate toll on the poor. In addition, the 
poor lack the political capital to demand changes to this system. For neomaterialists like 
Lynch and Coburn (2000), social connectedness matters, but the type is more important. 
Whereas Wilkinson pays attention to horizontal (informal) connections, they argue that 





groups tend to lack linkages to powerful political, economic, legal, and other institutions. 
Empirically, Flegg (1982) found, net of other factors, inequality is associated with 
an increase in infant mortality. Waldman (1992) concluded a greater share of income 
going to the rich is correlated with higher infant mortality. In a study of both developed 
and LDCs, Hales et al. (1999) found “average measures of population health are 
influenced by the distribution of income within societies” (2047), higher infant mortality 
being more widespread in the most inegalitarian societies. Beckfield (2004), however, 
found the effects of income inequality disappear when models are correctly specified and 
a wider array of controls is included in the analysis.  
  
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Design 
I am interested in understanding how the structure and magnitude of FDI affect 
life expectancy and infant mortality in LDCs over time. Panel data analysis is the clear 
choice in conducting this research, both in terms of theory and as informed by previous 
research. Because many scholars hypothesize the effects of FDI and other macrolevel 
factors take several years to compound (i.e., Chase-Dunn 1975; Firebaugh and Beck 
1994; Singer and Willett 2003), it is necessary to view these phenomena over the long 
term. Following this logic, virtually all past researchers have striven for longitudinal data, 
even from the first cross-national studies examining the effects of FDI on the economies 
of poor countries (i.e., Chase-Dunn 1975). Since that time, the methodology has become 
increasingly more sophisticated and researchers consistently rely upon it to reach their 
conclusions (i.e., Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Firebaugh 1992, 1996; Firebaugh and Beck 
1994; Jorgenson 2009a, 2009b; Kentor 2001). 
Singer and Willett (2003) urge researchers to use longitudinal, rather than purely 
cross-sectional data, as the latter will simply not suffice for statistical purposes. The 
authors have a methodological definition of longitudinal: “(1) multiple waves of data; (2) 
a substantively meaningful metric for time; and (3) an outcome that changes 





to increase the sample size quickly by including earlier time periods (when available), 
thus making the analysis more robust. In dynamic models of this type, that account for 
change over time, “current levels of the dependent variable are influenced by prior levels 
of that variable” (Sanderson and Kentor 2009:312). Countries that have received FDI in 
the past are likely to attract more in the future because they have built up necessary 
infrastructure and communication networks to ease the flow of international capital. This 
phenomenon is known as “cumulative causation” (Myrdal 1957). In order to control for 
events that occurred at earlier points in time, many researchers assert that “a dynamic 
model requires the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable” (Sanderson and Kentor 
2009:312). While this technique is able to account for the earlier condition of the 
dependent variable, it also introduces new bias in the form of residual autocorrelation, 
unobserved heterogeneity and nonstationarity. Residual autocorrelation occurs when the 
error terms of observations are correlated with each other. This is common in longitudinal 
research because errors tend to be correlated over time within countries. Unobserved 
heterogeneity occurs when a model does not contain relevant variables that are correlated 
with observed variables. Stationarity occurs when statistical properties of variables are 
constant over time. When variables are nonstationary, it may be difficult to determine 
whether the relationship between independent and dependent variables is spurious 
(Sanderson and Kentor 2009).  
Fixed- and random-effects panel models represent an attempt to improve upon the 
earlier lagged dependent variable methodology. A fixed-effects model (FEM) assumes 
that unobserved variables, while they differ across cases, are constant within a single case 





examples of such unobserved variables. A random-effects model (REM) assumes that 
some unobserved variables will be of the type described above, and others will vary 
randomly across time within a single case. In addition, in an FEM, variables that remain 
constant over time are dropped because their change score is equal to zero (Dougherty 
2011). 
While FEMs are considered more rigorous, REMs make more theoretical sense in 
this study because greater differences exist between countries than within them. An FEM 
would drop important explanatory variables simply because they do not change over 
time. An additional benefit of using REMs is they do not lose n degrees of freedom 
(Dougherty 2011).  
Sociologists engaged in longitudinal macrocomparative research disagree 
regarding whether to include a lagged dependent variable when using either REM or 
FEM methodologies. Some argue that its inclusion is redundant. Worse, as discussed 
previously, a lagged dependent variable can introduce new bias into the model. On the 
other hand, a model lacking a lagged dependent variable as a control may suffer from 
omitted variable bias. See Sanderson and Kentor (2009) for a detailed outline of a battery 
of specification tests to undertake in order to determine which model is the most 
appropriate for the data at hand. 
Variables 
Sample 
I focus on LDCs during the time period from 1985 to 2010. For the most part, 
scholars in this field exclude developed countries from their analyses because they wish 





are both poor (e.g., Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Jorgenson 2009a, 2009b; Jorgenson and 
Burns 2004; Shandra et al. 2004, 2005; Wimberley 1990; Yang and Pendleton 1980). 
While examining the time period from 1960 to the present would yield the 
greatest insight into the success of differing economic strategies, the data simply do not 
exist. Particularly for LDCs, record-keeping did not begin in earnest until much more 
recently, and many of the records that do exist have not been digitized and folded into an 
easily accessible database. Thus, the analysis is limited to the more modest time span of 
1985-2010. 
The criteria for inclusion in this analysis were twofold: first, countries had to have 
a GDP per capita in purchasing power parity of less than $20,000 for at least one year 
between 1985 and 2010. Second, countries had to have a population of at least one 
million. This resulted in a dataset of 125 countries (see Appendix), mostly located in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia.  
Dependent variables 
I use two dependent variables in these analyses. The first is under-five survival 
mortality, which is available from the United Nations statistical database. It is calculated 
as the number of child deaths per 1000 live births. As Bradshaw et al. (1993) point out, 
UNICEF encourages researchers to utilize the under-five mortality rates rather than the 
more conventional measure of infant mortality. This is because “infant mortality severely 
underestimates hardship for children because many die between ages 1 and 5; and child 
death rate does not standardize by number of births” (639). The second dependent 
variable is life expectancy at birth. This variable is derived from life tables by the World 






Modernization/Neoliberalism and Dependency/World System 
Both modernization/neoliberal and dependency/world system theorists view FDI 
as an important factor in economic and social development. However, they disagree 
regarding the direction of the relationship. While both tend to view economic 
development as a natural precursor to social development, modernization/neoliberal 
scholars expect FDI to spur economic growth and improve quality of life in LDCs; 
dependency/world system theorists anticipate that FDI will cause stagnation in economic 
and social development.  
Though previous researchers have used multiple measures of dependency, FDI is 
the most typical (i.e., Firebaugh and Beck 1994; Frey and Field 2000; Lena and London 
1993; Shandra et al. 2004, 2005; Shen and Williamson 1997, 2000; Wimberley 1990) 
because it is an essential feature of our increasingly globalized economy. While other 
measures of dependency—such as debt and trade—are certainly valuable, investment of 
capital via TNCs and their subsidiaries is the engine of global capitalism (Shen and 
Williamson 1997). D dependence is measured as the ratio of stocks of FDI to a nation’s 
GDP. Stocks refer to accumulated FDI; this is to distinguish it from flows, which refer to 
the amount of incoming investment over a specified time period. This distinction is 
important because scholars are interested in capturing foreign capital penetration, the 
extent to which a less developed economy is dominated by foreign capital (Dixon and 
Boswell 1996a), rather than simply FDI. FDI stocks as percent of GDP is available 
through the World Bank online database. 
In addition, Kentor and Boswell (2003) propose FDI concentration as an 





accounted for by the top investing country” (304). The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund online databases provide directional investment data, and the calculation 




 ,  (1) 
where i represents investments made by companies in foreign countries, and iT represents 
the investment made by the top investing country. 
Gender Stratification 
Previous literature has tended to focus on absolute measures of women’s status, as 
well as relative to men’s (Boehmer and Williamson 1996). As such, I will use both 
female secondary school enrollment and male/female enrollment ratio. Contraceptive 
prevalence taps into a different dimension of gender equality, that of domestic autonomy 
(Boehmer and Williamson 1996; Scanlan 2004). As a measure of women’s access to 
political power, I will use per cent women in parliament (Boehmer and Williamson 
1996). All measures are available from the United Nations online database.  
Developmental State 
State strength is measured as state revenue as a percent of GDP (Lena and London 
1993). In addition, to explore how states allocate their resources, public health 
expenditure is an important measure. Self and Grabowski (2003) found that public health 
expenditure is a significant indicator of health among lower and middle income nations. 







Additional control variables are relevant to each of these perspectives. Controlling 
for GDP per capita is crucial, as there is great variability in standard of living between 
nations. In addition, larger economies will, by their nature, attract larger investments. 
Second, a country’s geography and political regime are important considerations. Region, 
measured as a dummy variable, can exert a powerful influence on a state’s economic and 
human well-being (Scanlan 2004; Sharma 2004; Tsai 2006). These relationships do not 
exist in a vacuum, and including region as a control allows researchers to take into 
account the cultural and historical context.  
Regime ideology and political democracy can be powerful forces as well. 
Previous research has shown that left-leaning ideologies are more likely to favor 
redistributive policies which can reduce infant and child mortality (Lena and London 
1993; Tsai 2006). Similarly, countries with more effective democracies tend to be more 
responsive to the needs of their citizenry (Frey and Field 2000; Jorgenson 2009a, 2009b; 
Lena and London 1993; Moore, Texeira and Shiell 2006). Previous literature has utilized 
Bollen’s (1983) measure of democracy. More recently, scholars have begun to rely on the 
World Bank Governance indicators of “Voice and Accountability” (Moore, Texeira and 
Shiell 2006). 
Income inequality has been shown to increase mortality and poor health (Kawachi 
and Kennedy 2002). Researchers utilize any one of several measures of inequality, 
including the Gini coefficient of income, the Robin Hood Index and Theil’s entropy 
measure, among others. It is also common to measure income inequality as the share of 





2004; Waldmann 1992). Beckfield (2004) asserts that “the choice in income inequality 
measure matters little in inequality-health research” (234), as results remain consistent 
across measures. The most typical measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient 
(Beckfield 2004; Bergh and Nillson 2010; Flegg 1982; Hales 1999). This figure is based 
on the Lorenz curve, which displays what proportion of income x% of the population 
earns. The further the curve is from the 45-degree angle line representing perfect 
equality, the more unequal the population. The Gini coefficient gives the ratio between 
the line of equality and the Lorenz curve to the total area (Beckfield 2004). It is available 
from the World Bank. 
Finally, fertility rate is important to include as a control because it is so highly 
correlated with both child mortality and life expectancy (Brady, Kaya, and Beckfield 
2007; Bussman 2008; Jorgenson 2009a, 2009b). 
Data imputation 
Because of gaps in the availability of data, I utilize a data imputation technique, 
which allows me to employ a more balanced dataset. For the outcome variables, and the 
theoretically relevant indicator variables, I made no changes. However, when there were 
data gaps in other explanatory variables, I filled them with an estimate based on the 
values in the cells around them. This has the effect of smoothing some of the within-
country variability in the dataset. For instance, for Afghanistan, health expenditure data 
were missing from 1985-1999. I calculated the difference between the values in 2002 and 
2007, then distributed that value evenly across the missing years. See Table 3.1 for an 
illustration of this process, and note that under-five mortality figures were missing for 





Table 3.1. Data imputation 
Before imputation After imputation 








Afghanistan 1985   Afghanistan 1985   
Afghanistan 1986   Afghanistan 1986   
Afghanistan 1987  213.1 Afghanistan 1987  213.1 
Afghanistan 1988   Afghanistan 1988   
Afghanistan 1989   Afghanistan 1989   
Afghanistan 1990   Afghanistan 1990   
Afghanistan 1991   Afghanistan 1991   
Afghanistan 1992  176.8 Afghanistan 1992  176.8 
Afghanistan  1993   Afghanistan 1993   
Afghanistan 1994  162.9 Afghanistan 1994  162.9 
Afghanistan 1995   Afghanistan 1995   
Afghanistan 1996  152.0 Afghanistan 1996  152.0 
Afghanistan 1997   Afghanistan 1997   
Afghanistan 1998   Afghanistan 1998   
Afghanistan 1999  139.8 Afghanistan 1999  139.8 
Afghanistan 2000 0.369 136.2 Afghanistan 2000 0.369 136.2 
Afghanistan 2001 0.435 132.8 Afghanistan 2001 0.435 132.8 
Afghanistan 2002 0.624 129.2 Afghanistan 2002 0.624 129.2 
Afghanistan 2003  125.9 Afghanistan 2003 0.858 125.9 
Afghanistan 2004  122.7 Afghanistan 2004 1.092 122.7 
Afghanistan 2005  119.4 Afghanistan 2005 1.326 119.4 
Afghanistan 2006  116.3 Afghanistan 2006 1.560 116.3 
Afghanistan 2007 1.794 113.4 Afghanistan 2007 1.794 113.4 
Afghanistan 2008 2.353 109.7 Afghanistan 2008 2.353 109.7 
Afghanistan 2009 1.493 106.7 Afghanistan 2009 1.493 106.7 
Afghanistan 2010  103.9 Afghanistan 2010  103.9 
 
  
CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS  
Life expectancy at birth 
Table 4.1 provides bivariate correlations for each variable included in the 
analyses, and Table 4.2 gives descriptive statistics for each. Table 4.3 reports findings for 
the random-effects panel analyses performed for the dependent variable life expectancy 
at birth. Table 4.4 reports the fixed-effects panel analyses for the same variables. Five 
tested models are reported, all of which include the control variables of fertility, domestic 
investment, income inequality, and GDP per capita. For each of the models, regime 
ideology was dropped from the analysis due to sample size limitations. 
Model 1 consists of FDI and FDI concentration, and represents a test of the 
Modernization/Dependency debate.  Neither variable is significant, meaning there is no 
support for either Modernization or Dependency theory. Fertility is significant and 
negatively associated with life expectancy, consistent with theoretical expectations: 
countries with greater fertility tend to have lower life expectancy. Domestic investment 
and GDP per capita are positively associated with life expectancy. While GDP per capita 
is expected to increase life expectancy, the finding for domestic investment is surprising. 
It is though that domestic investment would improve well-being outcomes. Random- and 
fixed-effects models yield substantively similar results.  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Life Expectancy and Its Predictors 
  Mean SD Skew Min Max N 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
4.1521 0.1624 -1.0315 3.2891 4.3857 2034 
FDI concentration -15.8318 1.9998 0.6356 -22.7964 -0.4213 2033 
FDI 0.4585 1.635 -1.7074 -13.4953 4.9734 1986 
State revenue 2.9406 0.985 7.2407 -1.4227 16.1799 1777 
Democracy 4.093 1.6775 0.1000 1.0000 7.0000 2019 
Regime ideology -0.1271 0.6943 0.1755 -1.0000 1.0000 2006 
Health expenditure 0.8588 0.6395 -1.6865 -5.0129 2.4202 2020 
F:M second school 
enroll 
4.4304 0.3766 0.5921 2.7473 7.8276 2021 
F second school 
enroll 
3.6934 0.8492 -1.5183 -2.2457 4.6987 1716 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 
3.6475 0.7015 -1.2276 0.5306 4.5643 2029 
Women in 
parliament 
2.4285 0.775 -0.9275 -1.2040 4.3347 2013 
Fertility 1.1595 0.5218 0.3513 0.0733 4.3601 2034 
Domestic investment 3.0503 0.3913 -1.8512 -1.2280 4.1589 1998 
Income inequality 1.7042 0.4055 -0.9435 -0.1985 2.4087 1943 





Table 4.3. Unstandardized Coefficients for the Regression of Life Expectancy,  








Model 3: Gender 
Stratification 





concentration -0.0003 -0.0003  0.0001  0.0026  0.0003 
FDI  0.0011  0.0014 -0.0002  0.0011  0.0008 
State revenue   -0.0209***   -0.0059 -0.0069 
Democracy   -0.0086   -0.0037 -0.0033 
Health 
expenditure   -0.0109    0.0099*  0.0095 
F:M second 
school enroll      0.0259*** -0.0273 -0.0043 
F second school 
enroll      0.0211**  0.0442***  0.0414*** 
Contraceptive 
prevalence      0.0275***  0.0126  0.0129 
Women in 
parliament      0.0034  0.0032  0.0036* 
Africa*FDI 
concentration          0.0001 
Asia*FDI 
concentration         -0.0012 
Americas*FDI 
concentration          0.0001 
Fertility -0.1371*** -0.0764*** -0.0779*** -0.0837*** -0.0783*** 
Domestic 
investment  0.0227***  0.0035  0.0277***  0.0047  0.0037 
Income inequality -0.0117 -0.0077 -0.0115* -0.0171*** -0.0161*** 
GDP per capita  0.0463***  0.0691***  0.0349***  0.0455***  0.0462*** 
Constant  3.8962***  3.8177***  3.6056***  3.8207***  3.7168*** 
R-sq within  0.4210  0.4736  0.6692  0.8024  0.8061 
R-sq between  0.4213  0.6181  0.5620  0.6128  0.6230 
R-sq overall  0.3962  0.5363  0.6237  0.5648  0.5708 
N of groups  100  78  59  46  46 
Min/Max # of obs.  1/25 1/16  1/16  1/16  1/216 








Table 4.4. Unstandardized Coefficients for the Regression of Life Expectancy,  








Model 3: Gender 
Stratification 




FDI concentration -0.0003 -0.0003  0.0001  0.0002  0.0003 
FDI  0.0008  0.0010 -0.0002  0.0012  0.0012 
State revenue   -0.0212***   -0.0089 -0.0068 
Democracy   -0.0084   -0.0043 -0.0052 
Health 
expenditure   -0.0066    0.0106*  0.0084 
F:M second 
school enroll      0.0285 -0.0205  0.0079 
F second school 
enroll      0.0245***  0.0498***  0.0436*** 
Contraceptive 
prevalence      0.0333***  0.0231*  0.0094 
Women in 
parliament      0.0021  0.0017  0.0039* 
Africa         -0.1346*** 
Africa*FDI 
concentration      0.0002 
Asia         -0.0625* 
Asia*FDI 
concentration     -0.0016* 
Americas         -0.0116 
Americas*FDI 
concentration      0.0001 
Fertility -0.1216*** -0.0742*** -0.0607*** -0.0685*** -0.0658*** 
Domestic 
investment  0.0226***  0.0036  0.0280***  0.0051  0.0044 
Income inequality -0.0133* -0.0077 -0.0114* -0.0163*** -0.0141** 
GDP per capita  0.0608***  0.0766***  0.0435***  0.0498***  0.0412*** 
Constant  3.7422***  3.7208***  3.4702***  3.6747  3.7236 
R2 within  0.4177  0.4720  0.6632  0.7979  0.8036 
R2 between  0.4913  0.6346  0.6340  0.6651  0.8127 
R2 overall  0.4720  0.5497  0.6999  0.6368  0.8086 
N of groups  100  78  59  46  46 
Min/Max # of obs.  1/25  1/16  1/16  1/16  1/16 






democracy, and health expenditure. In both random- and fixed-effects models, FDI and 
FDI concentration beta values remain insignificant.  Of the new variables added, only 
state revenue has a significant impact on life expectancy. It is in the hypothesized 
direction, suggesting that a stronger state apparatus can have a salutary effect on this 
measure of well-being. In terms of the control variables, domestic investment is no longer 
significant. Fertility and GDP per capita remain significant, and in the same directions. 
In Model 3, the Developmental State indicators are replaced by those of Gender 
Stratification theory: female-to-male secondary school enrollment ratio, female 
secondary school enrollment rate, contraceptive prevalence, and percent women in 
parliament. Neither FDI nor FDI concentration are significant. In the fixed-effects model, 
female-to-male secondary school enrollment ratio, female secondary school enrollment 
rate, and contraceptive prevalence are significant indicators, and in the positive direction. 
Thus, life expectancy is higher in countries in which more women are enrolled in 
secondary school (both in absolute terms, and relative to their male counterparts), and in 
countries where women have greater reproductive freedom. The results are mirrored in 
the random-effects model, with the exception of female-to-male secondary school 
enrollment. These findings support Gender Stratification theory. For both fixed- and 
random-effects models, all of the control variables are significant. Domestic investment 
and GDP per capita are positively associated with life expectancy, while fertility and 
income inequality are negatively associated. 
Results change somewhat in Model 4, which includes both Developmental State 
and Gender Stratification indicators. There continues to be no support for either 





lending some support to the Developmental State theory; state revenue, however, no 
longer has a significant beta value. In the fixed-effects model, female secondary school 
enrollment is significant, while female secondary school enrollment and contraceptive 
prevalence are significant in the random-effects model. This finding lends some support 
to Gender Stratification theory. Fertility, income inequality, and GDP per capita remain 
significant, and in the directions predicted. Domestic investment is not significant. 
Model 5 adds region (in the random-effects analysis) and regional interactions 
with FDI concentration to the full model. When the region interaction is added to the 
fixed- effect model, the effects of health expenditure disappear. In addition, number of 
women in parliament emerges for the first time as a significant indicator of life 
expectancy. It is positively associated, so greater female political participation is 
associated with greater life expectancy. The control variables remain unchanged from 
Model 4. 
The results are quite different in the random-effects model. While Development 
State, Gender Stratification, and control variables mirror the findings in the fixed-effects 
model, regional differences now emerge. Africa, Asia, and Asia-FDI concentration 
interactions variables are all significant and negative. This suggests that African and 
Asian nations tend to have lower life expectancy than other poor countries, even when 
controlling for things like GDP per capita and fertility. In addition, while FDI 
concentration is not a significant indicator of life expectancy, it is when included as an 
interaction with Asia. However The Africa regional dummy variable is significant and 
negative, though the two other regional dummy variables (Asia and the Americas) are not 





dependency theory, and suggests that countries in Asia are uniquely affected by the 
nature of the relationship between FDI concentration and life expectancy.  
These analyses suggest arguments posed by Dependency, Developmental State, 
and Gender Stratification theorists may all contribute to the explanation for the variation 
in life expectancy between poor countries. In opposition to predictions posited by 
Modernization, FDI is consistently insignificant across all models. However, Dependency 
theory appears to apply only to Asian countries.  
Under-Five Mortality 
Table 4.5 provides bivariate correlations for each variable included in the 
analyses, and Table 4.6 gives descriptive statistics for each. Table 4.7 reports findings for 
the random-effects panel analyses performed for the dependent variable under-five 
mortality. Table 4.8 reports the fixed-effects panel analyses for the same variables. 
As for the analyses performed for the life expectancy dependent variable, five 
tested models are reported. Each includes the control variables of fertility, domestic 
investment, income inequality, and GDP per capita.  
In both random- and fixed-effects Model 1, FDI is negatively significant while 
FDI concentration is not significant. This lends support to Modernization theory. Of the 
control variables, higher fertility is associated with higher under-five mortality, while 
greater GDP per capita reduces it. Neither domestic investment nor income inequality is 
significant. 
Model 2 adds the Development State indicators. In both models, the effect of 
FDI disappears, meaning there is no support for either Modernization or Dependency  
  
Table 4.5. Bivariate Correlations for Under-Five Mortality and Its Predictors
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Under 5 
mortality 
1               
FDI 
concentration 
2 -0.1354              
FDI 3 -0.2739 -0.3790             
State revenue 4 -0.3051 0.0602 0.0441            
Democracy 5 0.4633 -0.0198 -0.2024 -0.2230           
Regime 
ideology 
6 -0.0469 0.0982 -0.0349 0.0328 -0.0933          
Health 
expenditure 
7 -0.4555 0.0007 0.1274 0.3019 -0.5240 0.0512         
F:M second 
school enroll 
8 -0.5475 0.0359 0.1410 0.5880 -0.3619 0.1004 0.3718        
F second 
school enroll 
9 -0.7373 0.0359 0.2021 0.2712 -0.4479 0.0693 0.3315 0.5365       
Contraceptive 
prevalence 
10 -0.7070 0.1058 0.1309 0.2477 -0.3569 0.0960 0.3426 0.5368 0.7705      
Women in 
parliament 
11 -0.1177 -0.0142 0.0879 0.1287 -0.2956 -0.1363 0.2254 0.1114 0.0044 0.0370     
Fertility 12 0.8291 -0.1072 -0.2746 -0.3006 0.4064 -0.0198 -0.3495 -0.4676 -0.7380 -0.6800 -0.1028    
Domestic 
investment 
13 -0.3325 -0.0347 0.2240 0.1674 -0.0700 -0.0636 0.1236 0.2566 0.3305 0.2787 -0.0698 -0.3477   
Income 
inequality 
14 0.0612 0.0419 -0.0985 -0.0029 0.3470 -0.1040 -0.3574 -0.1373 -0.1024 -0.2001 -0.2844 -0.1129 0.1625  
GDP per 
capita 





Table 4.6. Descriptive Statistics for Under-Five Mortality and Its Predictors 
   Mean SD Skew Min Max N 
Under 5 mortality 3.8186 0.9119 -0.1637 1.3350 5.7484 2047 
FDI 
concentration 
-15.8339 1.9963 0.6362 -22.7964 -0.4213 2046 
FDI 0.4609 1.6328 -1.7069 -13.4953 4.9734 1999 
State revenue 2.9416 0.9829 7.2404 -1.4227 16.1799 1788 
Democracy 4.0233 1.6782 0.0975 1.0000 7.0000 2031 
Regime ideology -0.1260 0.6943 0.1734 -1.0000 1.0000 2016 
Health 
expenditure 
0.8608 0.6399 -1.6782 -5.0129 2.4202 2032 
F:M second 
school enroll 
4.4305 0.3763 0.5823 2.7473 7.8276 2033 
F second school 
enroll 
3.6953 0.8492 -1.5183 -2.2457 4.6987 1726 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 
3.6488 0.7006 -1.2310 0.5306 4.5643 2041 
Women in 
parliament 
2.4311 0.7749 -0.9314 -1.2040 4.3347 2025 
Fertility 1.1574 0.5221 0.3543 0.0733 4.3601 2046 
Domestic 
investment 
3.0507 0.3914 -1.8415 -1.2280 4.1589 2009 
Income 
inequality 
1.7066 0.4053 -0.9492 -0.1985 2.4087 1956 





Table 4.7. Unstandardized Coefficients for the Regression of Under-Five Mortality,  









Model 3: Gender 
Stratification 




FDI concentration -0.0013  0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0003 
FDI -0.0232*** -0.0965 -0.0027  0.0003  0.0012 
State revenue   0.0485   0.0853*  0.0900* 
Democracy   0.0668**   0.0786*  0.0787* 
Health 
expenditure  -0.0551  -0.0519 -0.0496 
F:M second 
school enroll    0.0303  0.3662*  0.2798 
F second school 
enroll   -0.0969* -0.1522* -0.1407* 
Contraceptive 
prevalence   -0.1453** -0.0537*** -0.3503*** 
Women in 
parliament   -0.0447*** -0.0692*** -0.0706*** 
Africa*FDI 
concentration      0.0004 
Asia*FDI 
concentration      0.0037 
Americas*FDI 
concentration      0.0020 
Fertility  0.8239***  0.6141***  0.8053*** 0.9982***  0.7040*** 
Domestic 
investment  0.0013  0.0294* -0.0587*  0.0176  0.0222 
Income inequality  0.0701  0.0111  0.0326  0.0846***  0.0807 
GDP per capita -0.6601*** -0.8193*** -0.6220*** -0.7283*** -0.7325*** 
Constant  8.0432  9.5070***  8.9266***  8.8833***  9.2594*** 
R-sq within  0.7950  0.8043  0.7855  0.8630  0.8061 
R-sq between  0.6234  0.7429  0.6400  0.7069  0.6230 
R-sq overall  0.6324  0.7218  0.7008  0.7241  0.5708 
N of groups  100  78  59  46  46 
Min/Max # of obs.  1/25  1/16  1/16  1/16  1/16 






Table 4.8. Unstandardized Coefficients for the Regression of Under-Five Mortality,  








Model 3: Gender 
Stratification 




FDI concentration -0.0014  0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 
FDI -0.2419*** -0.0079 -0.0052 -0.0088 -0.0091 
State revenue   0.0502   0.0384  0.0494 
Democracy   0.0727**   0.0906*  0.0969** 
Health 
expenditure  -0.0548  -0.0284 -0.0227 
F:M second 
school enroll   -0.0669  0.3243*  0.1357 
F second school 
enroll   -0.1316** -0.2306** -0.2058 
Contraceptive 
prevalence   -0.1435** -0.1667* -0.1482 
Women in 
parliament   -0.0463*** -0.0828*** -0.0886*** 
Africa      0.1086 
Africa*FDI 
concentration      0.0010 
Asia      0.3716 
Asia*FDI 
concentration      0.0084 
Americas      0.1511 
Americas*FDI 
concentration     -0.0029 
Fertility  0.7929***  0.5549***  0.6076***  0.6216***  0.5569*** 
Domestic 
investment  0.0003  0.0250 -0.0575*  0.0100  0.0167 
Income inequality  0.0677** -0.0022 -0.0011  0.0542  0.0446 
GDP per capita -0.6629*** -0.8028*** -0.5755*** -0.5829*** -0.5675*** 
Constant  8.0432*** 9.4815***  7.3854***  7.7216***  8.2075*** 
R2 within  0.7849 0.8039  0.7799  0.8533  0.8528 
R2 between  0.6275 0.7469  0.6926  0.7112  0.7313 
R2 overall  0.6386 0.7260  0.7457  0.7165  0.7353 
N of groups  100 78  59  46  46 
Min/Max # of obs.  1/25 1/16  1/16  1/16  1/16 





      theories. In both models, greater levels of democracy are associated with lower under-
      five mortality rates. This suggests some support for the Developmental State theory.  
      Fertility and domestic investment are positively associated with under-five mortality in  
      the fixed-effects model, while GDP per capita is negatively associated. Mirroring Model 1,  
      fertility and GDP per capita are significant in the random-effects model. 
        In Model 3, Developmental State indicators are replaced by those of Gender 
      Stratification. A lack of significance for the Modernization/Dependency indicators persists. 
      However, in both the fixed- and random-effects models, female secondary school enroll- 
      ment, contraceptive prevalence, and percent women in parliament are negatively significant.  
      This finding lends strong support to Gender Stratification theory. Fertility, domestic invest-
      ment, and GDP per capita are all significant, and in the same directions as in previous  
      models for both fixed- and random-effects estimates. 
        The full model reintroduces the Developmental State variables. Neither FDI nor 
      FDI concentration is significant. Results for the democracy indicator are consistent in both 
      fixed- and random-effects models, but state revenue is positively associated with under-five  
      mortality in the fixed-effects model. This finding is surprising, as Developmental State  
      theory predicts a negative relationship. All Gender Stratification variables are in both fixed- 
      and random-effects models. However, female-to-male secondary school enrollment ratio is 
      positively associated with under-five mortality, contraindicated by Gender Stratification 
      theorists. In the fixed-effects model, greater fertility rates and higher income inequality 
      increase under-five mortality. On the whole, results of Model 4 strongly support Gender   






In Model 5, regional dummy variables and regional interactions are introduced. 
FDI and FDI concentration continue to lack significance. In addition, the region and 
region-FDI concentration interaction do not reach significance. Results for 
Developmental State variables remain unchanged from Model 4. However, results for 
Gender Stratification indicators differ substantially in the fixed- and random-effects 
models. While female secondary school enrollment, contraceptive prevalence, and 
percent women in parliament are all significant in the hypothesized directions in the 
fixed-effects model, only percent women in parliament appears significant in the random-
effects model. The difference between the two models lies in the presence of regional 
dummy variables, suggesting that region itself may account for much of the variability 
between countries. Fertility and GDP per capita are both significant, and in directions 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Hypothesis 1: Greater FDI penetration reduces life expectancy 
Hypothesis 2: Greater FDI concentration reduces life expectancy  
Foreign direct investment penetration is not a significant indicator of life 
expectancy in any model; thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Foreign direct investment 
concentration is not significant by itself, but is significant in its interaction with the Asia 
regional dummy variable. This lends some support to Hypothesis 2. 
For life expectancy, no one theory can claim supremacy. These analyses suggest 
arguments posed by Dependency, Developmental State, and Gender Stratification 
theorists all contribute to the explanation for the variation in life expectancy between 
poor countries. However, these results do make clear that Modernization theory is 
untenable in the context of life expectancy. Foreign direct investment and FDI 
concentration are consistently insignificant across all models, in opposition to predictions 
posited by both Modernization and Dependency. However, Dependency theory appears 
to apply to countries in Asia.  
Both Asia and Africa dummy variables are significant and negative in the 
random-effects model. In fact, the Africa dummy variable has the largest beta value (-




on a nation’s life expectancy. Historical, cultural, and social contexts matter, and Africa 
has consistently been the poorest region on the planet for many decades. For example, 
during the time period examined, the urban slum population in Africa has increased 
dramatically in response to a variety of push and pull factors. These concentrations of 
“poverty, overcrowding, malnutrition, insufficient garbage disposal, lack of adequate 
water drainage, and unsafe drinking water and sanitation” (Jorgenson, Rice, and Clark 
2012: 3498) constitute a major public health issue.  
Similarly a nation’s geographic position in Asia is associated with a reduction in 
life expectancy. The interaction between Asia and FDI concentration suggests that the 
unique historical, cultural, and social context in Asia creates a situation in which greater 
dependence on FDI from just a few investor nations is detrimental to life expectancy. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater FDI penetration increases under-five mortality  
Hypothesis 4: Greater FDI concentration increases under-five mortality 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. In Model 1, FDI penetration is negatively 
associated with under-five mortality, but the relationship washes out when other variables 
are included. FDI concentration never reaches significance in any model, even when 
included as an interaction term with the regional dummy variables. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is 
also not supported. 
For the dependent variable under-five mortality, findings lend support to 
Developmental State and Gender Stratification theories. In contrast to the life expectancy 
results, region does not seem to be relevant for child mortality. Instead, fertility rate and 
GDP per capita consistently have the largest beta value. In addition, while FDI 





neither FDI nor FDI concentration seem to matter for under-five mortality. 
The seemingly contradictory findings for life expectancy and under-five mortality 
are puzzling. The two measures are very highly correlated (-0.864), as they should be—
life expectancy is calculated by examining mortality at each age, including children under 
five years old. Life expectancy at birth reflects the overall mortality of a population, 
while under-five mortality focuses on a smaller segment. Thus, these analyses show that 
greater levels of FDI and greater concentration of foreign direct have no effect on young 
children. However, a greater concentration of FDI is detrimental to older children and/or 
adults (these analyses are not able to parse more detail in benefits meted out to each age 
group) in Asia. 
Perhaps foreign investment is sometimes directed toward sectors of the economy 
where it is harmful to longevity, but not to young children. Another possibility is that 
investors are wielding whatever political power they have gained to enact policies 
safeguarding the health of young children while disregarding the health of others. 
Reducing child mortality is a relatively straightforward endeavor: Focusing on 
inexpensive solutions like sanitation, vaccinations, and basic prenatal care can drastically 
reduce under-five mortality (Bryce, Black and, Victora 2013; Darmstadt et al 2013; 
Peterson, Haidar, and Merialdi 2012). Extending life expectancy is more complicated. 
While efforts to reduce child mortality would surely help all members of a community, 
adults and older children have additional needs. Health hazards like unsafe working 
conditions, accumulated exposure to environmental toxins, and chronic illness would not 
affect people in LDCs until later in life. Indeed, prescriptions for increasing life 




Smith 1997; Wilkinson 1996, 1999). 
This is borne out by examining the rates of change of life expectancy and under-
five mortality. While both have improved since 1985, the first year examined in this 
paper, under-five mortality has improved much more rapidly. The mean child mortality 
rate for countries in this dataset was 78 per 1,000 live births. In 2011, the figure was 52, a 
33% reduction. Alternatively, the increase in life expectancy was only 3%, from 64 to 66 
years old. There is more room for improvement in child mortality than life expectancy—
in Sweden, for example, the child mortality rate is 3 deaths per 1,000 live births, while 
the upper limit for life expectancy in 2012 was 86 years old for women in Japan (World 
Bank online database http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/).  
Thus, framing the debate as between either Modernization or Dependency is too 
simplistic an approach. Neither approach satisfactorily explains changes in the health of 
human populations. In order to truly seek solutions to problems facing the Global South, 
strategies offered by Dependency must be combined with those of Gender Stratification 
and Development State theories. 
Conclusion 
Drawing from the theoretical and empirical research in economic and health 
sociology, this study examined the effects of foreign investment and foreign investment 
concentration on life expectancy and under-five mortality in 125 less developed 
countries. Results of fixed- and random-effects panel regression analyses suggest a 
complicated relationship. While FDI concentration decreases life expectancy in Asia, it 
has no effect in other regions or on under-five mortality.  




its size. For life expectancy, there was no model for which the amount of FDI was 
significant. Overall, the structure of the investment does not matter either. However, the 
structure of the investment is important in Asian countries. Life expectancy in Asian 
countries is longer when the source of FDI is diverse, regardless of how much FDI is 
coming in. For child mortality, neither the structure nor the level of FDI is important.  
On the whole, neither FDI nor FDI concentration are the main drivers of the 
health of human populations, as argued by Modernization theorists. No one strategy can 
be called upon to provide definitive solutions to the problems plaguing poor countries. 
Instead, solutions must be tailored to fit each nation’s unique economic, cultural, 
geographical, and historical context. More research should be devoted to understanding 
these contexts. However, the analyses presented in this paper may give some guidance. 
First, efforts to enhance the status of women should accelerate. Countries with greater 
gender parity in education and politics, and those granting more extensive reproductive 
rights are associated with increases in life expectancy. Those with a larger proportion of 
women in parliament have lower under-five mortality. Thus, countries granting women 
more power in educational, reproductive, and political realms have better health 
outcomes. 
Second, governments should devote greater resources to providing public health 
services, including “[preventive and curative treatments], family planning activities, 
nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health” (World Bank). A stronger 
state, as measured by state revenue per capita, is associated with better outcomes for child 
mortality. Thus, efforts should be made to shore up weak governmental structures. In 





Finally, these analyses show that in some cases, the nature of FDI matters more 
than the volume. Asian nations should either seek to diversify their FDI countries of 
origin, or shun it altogether. This is not the case for countries in other regions. In Africa 
and the Americas, FDI concentration has no significant effect on life expectancy. In 
contrast, it is not associated with under-five mortality rates in any region.  
This research is not without its limitations. As always, data availability is a major 
issue, particularly for the less developed countries. While many researchers hypothesize 
the greatest changes occurring in the 1980s (McMichael 2004), country-specific 
investment data do not go back further than 1985, placing a boundary on the front end of 
this analysis.  
The mechanisms by which FDI and FDI concentration affect countries, and why 
they do so differently depending on geography and outcome measured, are unclear. 
Future research exploring this question would contribute a great deal to this literature. 
Perhaps the industry or sector typically invested in is responsible for the difference: for 
example, do investments in Asia tend to be more destructive to the environment, or 
limited to primary sector endeavors such as agriculture and mining? In addition, 
investigating the effect of FDI and FDI concentration on other measures of well-being, 
such as food security, would be beneficial.  
Sectoral investment may have an impact as well. Primary and secondary sector 
industries tend be environmentally unfriendly (Jorgenson 2007; 2009b), and may have 
detrimental impacts on human health and longevity. The effects of tertiary investment 




may contribute to semiproletarianization (Evans and Timberlake 1980). However, 
Firebaugh and Beck (1994) argue the higher wages that accompany tertiary sector jobs 
create competition, stimulating higher wages in all sectors. Indirectly, tertiary investment 
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